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Abstract 
The Equalities Review is an independent panel set up by the UK government in 
2005 to investigate the persistence of social inequalities and to make 
recommendations for the development of a unified Commission for Equality 
and Human Rights. This paper was originally written for the Review. It 
canvasses possible responses to the questions, ‘equality between whom?’ and 
‘equality of what?’. It argues that equality of outcome is intuitively appealing 
but risks ignoring variations in need, differences in values and preferences, and 
the importance of individual agency. A broad interpretation of equality of 
opportunity, such as is provided by the capability approach, can address these 
limitations, by focusing on the substantive freedom enjoyed by individuals. 
Substantive freedom may be limited by a lack of personal resources, or by the 
economic, social, political, cultural, and environmental conditions context in 
which the individual is operating. The paper concludes by identifying, and 
indicating solutions to, a number of measurement issues that arise in 
operationalising the capability approach.  
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Summary 
Human rights specify minimum standards, whereas equality is concerned with 
people getting the same, or being treated the same, in some respect. Different 
concepts of equality can be distinguished by their responses to two key 
questions: 
 
? equality between whom? 
? equality of what? 
 
The response to the first question has already been determined to some extent 
for the Equalities Review – the body overseeing the establishment of the single 
Commission for Equality and Human Rights in the UK. The Equalities Review 
is to be concerned about equality by sex, ethnicity, disability, sexual orientation, 
religion, and age. The selection of these characteristics is not random but is 
because they share two features: 
 
? they are treated as beyond individual control; 
? they are a source of significant discrimination and inequality.  
 
On the basis of these two criteria, a key omission from the list is social class; its 
exclusion from the list would have to be justified explicitly on other grounds. 
 
Responses to the question, ‘equality of what?’ can be grouped under three 
headings: 
 
? equality of process 
? equality of outcome 
? equality of opportunity. 
 
Equality of process may be an important component of discrimination but the 
concept is not sufficient to capture all forms of discrimination, let alone broader 
concerns about inequality.  
 
Equality of outcome is intuitive and straightforward but risks ignoring: 
 
? variations in need; 
? differences in values and preferences; 
? individual agency and responsibility.  
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Equality of opportunity can be interpreted in a variety of ways. A broad 
interpretation, such as the capability approach, addresses the limitations listed 
above for concepts based on equality of outcome.  
 
Analysis of inequality according to the capability approach focuses on 
differences in the substantive freedom enjoyed by individuals, that is, in the 
things that they are able to do or be in their lives. Substantive freedom may be 
limited by a lack of personal resources, but also by the context in which the 
individual is operating – the economic, social, political, cultural, and 
environmental conditions. 
 
A number of measurement issues arise: 
 
? Selection of dimensions of inequality (capabilities). One possibility is to 
use existing frameworks, such as human rights instruments, as a starting 
point. An alternative is to engage in democratic deliberation (for example 
through public consultation) in order to develop or refine a list of 
important capabilities.  
 
? Measuring opportunity. Distinguishing between differences in outcome 
which are due to differences in underlying values and preferences, and 
those which are due to differences in substantive freedom is always 
difficult. Direct measures of autonomy (choice and control) may be 
useful. More generally, progress can be made using a hierarchy:  
 
basic capabilities, where any difference in outcomes can be safely 
assumed to be the result of differences in substantive freedom; 
intermediate capabilities, where any difference in outcomes can be 
assumed, for the purposes of public policy, to be the result of 
differences in substantive freedom; 
complex capabilities, where supplementary evidence is needed on 
whether there are relevant differences in values and preferences 
between groups.  
 
? Aggregation. Attempting to summarise inequality across dimensions is 
tempting but fails to respect the plurality of human ends and faces 
technical difficulties. Instead, the volume of information can be made 
manageable by using ‘headline indicators’. ‘Partial ranking’ provides an 
alternative way to identify potential policy priorities. 
 
? Inequality within groups. Further analysis is helpful to identify sub-
groups which may be particularly disadvantaged. However additional 
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sensitivity needs to be balanced against the risk of ‘losing the message in 
the detail’. 
 
The paper concludes that the capability approach provides the foundation for 
measures of inequality which meet a number of desirable criteria. The measures 
should be:  
 
? well-grounded theoretically;  
? multi-dimensional; 
? transparent; 
? quantifiable; 
? capable of tracking change over time; 
? applicable to inequality for each group (as defined by sex, ethnicity, 
disability, sexual orientation, religion and age). 
 
However, the choice of measurement tool is, ultimately, a normative decision, 
because it depends on the underlying concept of equality. 
 
1. Background 
This paper was written to inform the deliberations of the Equalities Review, an 
independent panel set up by the UK government in 2005 to investigate the 
persistence of social inequalities in the UK and to make recommendations for 
the development of the Commission for Equality and Human Rights. The 
Commission is due to be established in 2007 and will combine the roles of the 
current Commission for Racial Equality, Equal Opportunities Commission, and 
Disability Rights Commission together with taking responsibility for overseeing 
the Human Rights Act. Promoting age equality, equality between people of 
different sexual orientation, and of different religions will also become part of 
Commission’s remit.    
 
2. Equality and human rights 
We can start from the assumption that equality of some kind is important in its 
own right. Valuing equality means placing value on people getting the same, or 
being treated the same, in some respect. Although this may seem 
uncontroversial, it is worth noting that equality is a distinct value from, say, the 
principles of sufficiency, priority or desert.1 
                                           
1  See Arneson (2002). 
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? Sufficiency: everyone should reach at least a minimum threshold (eg a 
minimum standard of living). 
? Priority: the needs of the worst off should take priority. 
? Desert: people should get what they deserve.  
 
The concept of equality needs further specification before it can be applied. 
Two critical questions are: 
 
(i) equality between whom, and 
(ii) equality of what. 
 
These are considered in the following two sections.  
 
The interpretation of the concept of human rights is contested, but human 
rights are generally understood to be minimum standards to which every 
individual is entitled. In this way they are closest to the principle of sufficiency. 
They serve to give priority (for example, over other claims on resources) to 
achieving a basic minimum for everyone.  
 
Consistent with the principle of sufficiency, everyone has the same minimum 
entitlement, but there is nothing objectionable from the point of view of human 
rights in inequality between individuals above that threshold level. For example, 
everyone has the right to life (Article 2 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, ECHR), but the existence of large inequalities in life expectancy for 
different social groups is consistent (potentially) with a state having met its 
obligations under the ECHR.  
 
Human rights are unconditional and this is one feature which distinguishes them 
from other kinds of rights. Entitlement is on the basis of your humanity. For 
other kinds of rights, entitlement may be based on having fulfilled certain 
conditions or having attained a certain status. Thus linking rights to 
responsibilities at an individual level makes sense in the context of other rights, 
but not in the context of human rights.   
 
3. Equality between whom 
Some of the parameters for the Equalities Review are already set. The basic 
comparisons will be between individuals in the UK according to their sex, 
ethnicity, disability, sexual orientation, religion and age. This identifies the 
relevant unit of analysis as the individual (rather than groups or nation states, 
for example); it identifies the relevant population as the UK; and it identifies the 
principal characteristics for analysis as the six listed.  
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Each of these specifications raises further questions, however. With respect to 
the population, one important issue is the distinction between residents and 
citizens. If current patterns of international migration continue, resident non-
citizens will become an increasingly important minority.2  
 
With respect to the characteristics for analysis, it is useful to consider the 
rationale for selecting these characteristics rather than any others. These 
characteristics share two relevant features: 
 
(i) the characteristic is treated as beyond an individual’s control3; 
(ii) historically, the characteristic has been a source of significant 
discrimination and inequality.  
 
The first feature is relevant because it is an important component of our belief 
that inequality due to this characteristic is unjust. To take a counterexample: 
even if wearing a mohican is associated with significant discrimination in 
employment (a plausible assumption), it is not a form of inequality which merits 
serious attention because the decision about whether or not to wear a mohican is 
clearly within an individual’s control.  
 
The second criterion, concerning whether the characteristic has historically been 
a source of significant discrimination or inequality, is necessary to avoid getting 
distracted by trivial or spurious inequalities. For example, eye colour is beyond 
individual control but since it is not, and has never been, a source of significant 
discrimination, it would be pointless to analyse inequality along these lines.   
 
Using these two criteria, one key omission from the list of characteristics for 
analysis is social class.4 Social class is determined very largely by family of 
origin and it is therefore reasonable to treat it as beyond individual control; it 
has also been a source of significant discrimination and inequality across most 
aspects of life since the advent of class society. There is a compelling case for 
                                           
2  Another issue which has recently come to the fore is the entitlement of people abroad 
subject to UK control, for example in the occupied territories in Iraq. This is mainly a 
question of human rights rather than equality, so it is not discussed further here.  
3  The expression ‘treated as beyond individual control’ is important because, for 
example, an individual can in principle choose to change his or her sex, or his or her 
religion.  However, it would not be reasonable to expect him or her to do so in order 
to avoid discrimination.  
4  In societies in which caste systems operate, caste would also be a strong candidate for 
inclusion in the list of potential grounds of discrimination.  
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including social class alongside other characteristics for analysis; its exclusion 
from the list would have to be justified explicitly on other grounds.  
 
Taking individuals, rather than groups, as the unit of analysis is an important 
statement of what is sometimes called ‘ethical individualism’. It means that 
each individual is regarded as important in his or her own right and that in no 
case should the interests of a group itself override the interests of individuals.5 
 
Ethical individualism should not be confused with methodological 
individualism. The latter is criticised for failing to recognise that individuals are 
members of groups (and of many different groups simultaneously), and that 
they are acted upon by larger social structures such as the economy, public 
attitudes and so on. It is perfectly possible to combine ethical individualism 
(placing value on each individual) with methodological pluralism (individuals 
influence, and are influenced by, groups and wider social structures).  
 
Further questions relating to taking individuals as the unit of analysis are 
addressed in section 4 below on measurement issues.  
 
4. Equality of what 
Responses to the question, ‘equality of what?’ can be grouped under three broad 
headings, although as will become clear in the discussion below, the distinctions 
between them are not always clear cut: 
 
? equality of process 
? equality of outcome 
? equality of opportunity. 
 
4.1 Equality of process 
Equality of process is concerned with ensuring that people are treated in the 
same manner. One example is equality of respect (Wolff, 1998). Although 
maintaining equality of respect almost certainly requires avoiding very wide 
inequality of material resources or opportunities, nevertheless it is the quality of 
                                           
5  To be clear, this applies in instances where the interests of a group entity conflict with 
the interests of individuals. For example, if the survival of a religious group is 
threatened because an insufficient number of young people choose to observe that 
religion, ethical individualism asserts that the individuals’ freedom of belief takes 
priority over the need of the group to sustain itself.  Ethical individualism does not 
imply that the effects of one individual’s behaviour on other individuals (who may or 
may not form part of a group) should be disregarded.  
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relations between people, the interactions between them, and the interactions 
between people and institutions which are the focus of analysis, not the 
distribution of any particular outcomes.  
 
Some human rights, for example, the right to a fair trial (ECHR Article 6), can 
be seen as enshrining aspects of equality of process. It is tempting, too, to think 
of non-discrimination as a matter of equality of respect and indeed some aspects 
of non-discrimination (freedom from being insulted in the workplace, for 
example) could be conceptualised in this way. However, discrimination does 
not always imply disrespect. Discrimination against disabled people often takes 
the form of lack of access to buildings, transport and information for example, 
which is better captured by the idea of inequality of opportunity (and outcome) 
than inequality of respect.  
 
4.2 Equality of outcome 
The most intuitive idea of equality is probably equality of outcome – equal 
shares of the cake. Outcomes may be defined in terms of material resources, 
resources more broadly (including, for example, education, health, and social 
capital), or some overarching concept of welfare or subjective well-being. 
Inequalities of outcome are easier to measure than either inequality of process 
or inequality of opportunity, because one can simply observe who has how 
much of what. The most widely used example is the distribution of income 
across individuals and indeed this concept is sometimes treated as synonymous 
with ‘inequality’.  
 
Despite its convenience and popularity, equality of outcome in its crudest form 
is not well-supported philosophically. In particular, allocating equal shares of 
some or all goods to all individuals risks ignoring: 
 
? variations in need; 
? differences in values and preferences; and 
? individual agency and responsibility.  
 
Variations in need mean that the same allocation of resources does not facilitate 
the same opportunity to achieve a valuable goal (say, an adequate standard of 
living) for everyone, and this is, arguably, unjust. A disabled person needs more 
resources than a non-disabled person, for example, in order to achieve the same 
standard of living.  
 
The second difficulty with equality of outcomes is that if individuals differ in 
their values and preferences, the same outcome will be more valuable to some 
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than to others.6 Participating in music-making is great if that is what you want to 
do, but not so good if you are an unwilling participant, or if you would rather be 
spending your time doing something else. What is valuable here is the equal 
opportunity to participate, should you wish to do so, not the equal outcome of 
everyone actually engaging in music-making.   
  
A related point is that equality of outcome, at least in a crude form, leaves little 
scope for individuals to determine a course of action and have a reasonable 
expectation of enjoying (or suffering) the consequences of it. If I train to run the 
marathon, only to find that in the race itself the organisers allocate to me a 
handicap in exact proportion to my fitness, I have lost the chance to formulate 
and pursue a plan of action.7 In other words, equality of outcome, if applied 
across the board, leaves little scope for individual agency or responsibility. 
 
4.3 Equality of opportunity 
Responding to these three concerns leads one to consider equality of 
opportunity. Broadly speaking, whether or not an individual has the opportunity 
to do something, for example, enter higher education, depends on the resources 
available to her, her skills and talents, the effort she makes, the institutional 
setting in which she is operating and possibly a certain amount of luck. 
Interpretations of equality of opportunity differ according to which of these 
components are considered legitimate sources of variation in the opportunities 
open to people, and which are not. This is represented in the diagram below. 
 
                                           
6  This difficulty, and the variations in need problem, might lead one to adopt a 
subjective measure of well-being, which can reflect both the extra needs some 
individuals have, and the different values placed by individuals on different outcomes. 
However, subjective metrics face other significant drawbacks which there is not space 
to consider here. See Sen (1985). 
7  It is often argued that equality of outcome would create an incentive for individuals to 
free-ride. Why should they labour when the benefit they receive will not depend upon 
the effort they make? Whether or not this is a valid argument, it concerns efficiency 
rather than equity. By contrast, the argument in the text seeks to highlight a tension 
between equality of outcome and individuals’ ability to shape their own lives, which 
is assumed to be ethically desirable.  
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Varieties of ‘equality of opportunity’ 
 
 
Narrow                  Wide 
 
 Meritocracy Responsibility egalitarianism Capability approach 
 
Opportunity = resources + talents + institutions + effort   (+ luck) 
 
Key: A  B  Interpretation A holds that effects of B should be equalised 
 
A meritocratic interpretation of equality of opportunity holds that whether an 
opportunity is open to you should depend only on your talents and the effort you 
make. Inequalities of outcome which are due irrelevant characteristics, such as 
gender or social class, are not justifiable. In practice, this is often taken to mean 
being ‘blind’ to characteristics and influences, other than talent and effort, and 
this assessment is made at a particular point in time for a particular purpose, for 
example, university entry. Unfortunately, simply ignoring gender and social 
class, and in particular failing to take account of the cumulative effect of 
disadvantage on the talents someone has been able to develop or the ‘effort’ 
someone has able to demonstrate, means that such assessments do not succeed 
in achieving their goal of meritocratic assessment, let alone any fuller idea 
equality of opportunity.  
 
The arguments used to support meritocracy often have a certain appeal – 
selecting the best person for the job, using resources efficiently, and so on – but 
can lead to unpalatable conclusions. For example, suppose someone is born 
with characteristics which are not regarded as ‘meritorious’: they are not 
particularly intelligent, sporty, beautiful or artistic. Such a person may work just 
as hard as his or her more talented sibling, but end up with limited education, 
poor employment conditions and a lifetime of poverty, and this is entirely 
consistent with equality of opportunity interpreted as meritocracy. Discomfort 
with this conclusion informs the basic premise of ‘responsibility 
egalitarianism’: circumstances beyond an individual’s control should not be 
allowed to influence the opportunity he or she has to thrive (Dworkin, 2000; 
Roemer, 1998). Since the talents you are blessed with – or the lack of talent you 
are cursed with – is not something for which you can reasonably be held 
responsible, you should be compensated for the effects of these on the 
opportunities available to you. Thus, for example, additional resources should 
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be devoted to those with lower ability to help them to gain educational 
qualifications, and disabled people should be given help with extra costs of 
living, and so on. Under full equality of opportunity of this kind, in principle, 
inequalities of outcome would arise only as a result of differences in effort or as 
a result of free choice.8  
 
There are two drawbacks to this interpretation. Firstly, it is very difficult both in 
theory and in practice to distinguish between differences which are due to 
circumstances beyond individual control and those which are due to free 
choice/effort. If a school student does badly in his GCSEs, how are we to tell to 
what extent that is due to his lack of revision and to what extent due to lack of 
parental support, poor early schooling, and so on? Even if the balance of 
probabilities is that is due to lack of revision, how can we tell to what extent 
that in turn was the result of pressures at home or just sheer idleness? 
 
Secondly, by focusing on the distinction between choice and constraint for the 
individual, responsibility egalitarianism runs the risk of ignoring the crucial role 
played by institutions in shaping the opportunities available to people. 
Institutions include formal institutions like the criminal justice system, 
economic institutions such as the labour market, and social institutions 
including social attitudes and culture. Disregarding the role of institutions can 
result in underestimating inequality of opportunity, by attributing the poor 
outcome someone experiences to their lack of effort or their free choice. More 
seriously, the policy responses which are prioritised tend to be targeted at 
individuals – personal advisors, attitudinal change, financial compensation - 
rather than tackling the underlying structural and institutional barriers. Similar 
arguments are made forcefully by those who identify institutional racism over 
and above individual instances of discrimination, and by advocates of the social 
model of disability.  
 
The capability approach addresses these two concerns by focusing substantive 
freedom, that is, what people are able to do or be in their lives (eg Sen, 1985, 
1998, 1999).9 Substantive freedom may be limited by a lack of personal 
resources, but also, crucially, by the context in which the individual is operating 
– the economic, social, political, cultural, even environmental conditions which 
determine what he or she can achieve, given his or her endowments and 
entitlements. According to the capability approach, the appropriate answer to 
                                           
8  Roemer (1998) acknowledges that some characteristics beyond individual control can 
affect the amount of effort an individual can make, and attempts to take account of 
this in his framework. 
9  ‘Substantive freedom’ and ‘capability’ are used interchangeably: both mean the range 
of valuable things that an individual is able to be or do in his or her life. 
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the question with which this section began, ‘Equality of what?’, is ‘substantive 
freedom’.  
 
The capability approach has a number of advantages in comparison to the other 
concepts of equality canvassed in this section: 
 
? it can incorporate many aspects of equality of process. For example, the 
right to a fair trial can be reformulated as the substantive freedom to seek 
and receive justice in the legal system. However, the capability approach 
is not limited to considerations of process.  
 
? it accommodates variations in need. An individual who has greater needs, 
for example, because she has children to look after, will need more 
flexible institutional arrangements and greater material resources, in order 
to have access to the same capability set (including employment, 
mobility, good health, and so on) as an individual without those 
additional needs. 
 
? diversity of values and preferences is supported by focusing on the 
substantive freedom individuals have to achieve valuable objectives, 
rather than on the outcomes themselves. Individuals may choose whether 
or not to make use of the opportunities they have open to them. This 
avoids the paternalism or authoritarianism which is sometimes associated 
with policies framed in terms of achieving equality of outcome.  
 
? the accumulation of advantage and disadvantage over a lifetime is 
acknowledged, firstly, by emphasising the way in which institutions and 
policies tend either to enhance or stunt the development of capabilities 
(for example in education), and secondly, by analysing what an individual 
is able to be or do in the present, based on his/her current circumstances 
and the characteristics s/he has acquired to date.   
 
? distinguishing between differences in outcome which are due to 
differences in underlying values and preferences, and those which are due 
to differences in opportunity is a difficulty for the capability approach, as 
for other versions of equality of opportunity. However, some progress can 
be made within the capability approach, as explored in section 4 below, 
by enriching narrowly-defined information about outcomes for 
individuals with information about their values and information on 
groups, institutions, and policies.  
 
The capability approach has been gaining support in academic circles for some 
time and there is a growing body of literature (HDCA, 2005). In recent years the 
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approach has also begun to be applied in policy settings. The United Nations 
Development Programme annual Human Development Reports are one 
important application and the most recent report included in-depth analysis of 
inequality in Western countries as well as in poorer nations (UNDP, 2005). The 
German government’s national action plan on poverty and social inclusion 
adopted a capabilities framework (European Commission, 2003). A recent 
speech by the UK Chancellor of the Exchequer quoted the work of Amartya Sen 
(Brown, 2005). Nevertheless there are some tricky issues in the application of 
the approach which remain to be resolved, and these are taken up in the next 
section.  
 
5. Measurement issues 
5.1 Multidimensionality 
A multidimensional measure is appropriate where the underlying concept – in 
the case of the capability approach, the substantive freedom individuals enjoy – 
is itself multidimensional.  Such an observation immediately raises the question, 
which dimensions? What capabilities, or aspects of substantive freedom, is it 
important to measure?  
 
There are two types of response to this in the literature. The first seeks to 
identify significant dimensions a priori. Many frameworks already exist. The 
human rights framework offers one promising avenue, particularly if extended 
to include the UN instruments on economic and social rights, in addition to the 
civil and political rights incorporated into the ECHR (Vizard, 2005). Careful 
analysis of people’s activities and interactions can lead to the derivation of a 
hierarchy of human need (Doyal and Gough, 1991). The Human Development 
Reports mentioned above use a stripped-down version of just three basic 
capabilities: life expectancy, literacy, and income (UNDP, 2005).  Alternatively, 
some work on social exclusion has used four key dimensions: consumption 
(covering income,  standard of living, and access to services), production 
(including access to, and conditions of employment, but also education and 
training, parenting, caring and volunteering), social interaction (social isolation, 
cultural activities, leisure) and political participation (interpreted as having a say 
over important aspects of your life, as well as more formal types of 
participation).   
 
The second response to the problem of identifying which capabilities to 
measure – and the one advocated by Sen, among others - is to acknowledge that 
there is no uniquely correct answer; rather the selection is a normative process 
which will be influenced by the context and purpose of the evaluation. For it to 
have validity, the process of selection needs to be as transparent, well-informed 
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and democratic as possible. There are examples of this being put into practice in 
evaluations of development projects (for example, Alkire, 2002). This 
interpretation of the capability approach therefore provides a strong rationale for 
engaging in public consultation.  
 
A priori selection of capabilities and public consultation can of course be 
combined, such that members of the public (in the form of a citizens’ jury or 
some other model) are invited to take a pre-defined list, or a set of criteria, as a 
starting point for their deliberations.10  
 
5.2 Measuring opportunity 
All attempts to measure equality of opportunity face the problem that whilst the 
actual activities and states of being of individuals are observable, the activities 
and so on that individuals could do, but are choosing not to do, are 
unobservable. As a consequence, if one person is employed and another person 
is not, it is difficult to be sure whether this is a result of differences in 
preferences and values, or whether it is the result of differences in the 
substantive opportunities open to them (i.e. a difference in their capability set).  
 
Fortunately, some activities or states of being are so basic that any difference in 
outcomes can be assumed to be a result of differences in capabilities, rather than 
differences in preference or values: no-one would choose to be assaulted, for 
example, so that if one group is consistently found to be assaulted more often 
than another, it can safely be concluded that this is due to a lack of substantive 
freedom rather than the result of free choice. Many human rights, including 
some economic and social rights at a basic level, are likely to fall into this 
category.  
 
Another category of capabilities are those where although it is possible to 
imagine differences in values or preferences that would give rise to differences 
in outcomes between groups, it is nevertheless legitimate for the purposes of 
public policy to assume that it is due to differences in capabilities. Examples 
here might include street homelessness: although there probably are some 
individuals who would choose to remain on the streets, even if there were 
suitable alternatives readily available to them, their numbers are vanishingly 
small and their choice would itself be assumed by many to be evidence of 
mental illness. Literacy and numeracy, income above the poverty line, and 
decent housing, to name a few obvious candidates, might also fall into this 
category.  
 
                                           
10  Nussbaum (2000) developed her list of basic capabilities in this way; Robeyns (2003) 
offers some possible criteria.  
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Finally, a third category of more complex or sophisticated capabilities might 
require additional evidence to be brought to bear to determine whether or not 
differences in outcome are the result of differences in capabilities (Robeyns, 
2003). For example, if one observed that participation in civic life varied by 
religion, one might want to investigate whether this was because religions have 
differing attitudes towards the value of civic participation. To err on the side of 
caution, the presumption would have to be that there is no such difference; the 
burden of proof would rest with those who wish to claim that there is no 
difference in substantive freedom, despite an observed difference in outcome. 
One useful observation here is that individual-level differences in taste for civic 
participation (or whatever), of which of course there are many in any large sub-
group of the population, provided they are not systematically related to the 
characteristic in question (in this example, religion), will be differenced out in 
the comparison between groups (Muslims and Christians). Thus the imaginary 
critic, who wished to show that the difference in outcome was not the result of a 
difference in substantive freedom between the two groups, would have to show 
that there is a relevant systematic difference in values and that these values are 
freely chosen.  
 
Capabilities could therefore be categorised into a hierarchy, looking something 
like this: 
 
(i) basic capabilities, where any difference in outcomes can be safely 
assumed to be the result of differences in substantive freedom; 
(ii) intermediate capabilities, where any difference in outcomes can be 
assumed, for the purposes of public policy, to be the result of 
differences in substantive freedom; 
(iii) complex capabilities, where supplementary evidence is needed on 
whether there are relevant differences in values and preferences 
between groups.  
 
It is important to keep in mind that inequality of outcome is being used in these 
instances as proxy for inequality of substantive opportunity. To emphasise this 
point, it may be worth attempting to add measures of overall freedom or 
autonomy. Some indicators are available, although this is an area is 
underdeveloped. The 1970 British Cohort Study age 26 survey, for example, 
included a question asking respondents to choose between two statements: “I 
usually have free choice and control over my life” and , “Whatever I do has no 
real effect on what happens to me”. Responses have been analysed by disability 
status (Burchardt, 2005), and further analysis by other characteristics would be 
possible. A more rigorous survey instrument, known as the locus of control 
scale, uses responses to several questions to construct an index of fatalism 
through to self-efficacy (Rotter, 1966). Alternatively, if appropriate long-run 
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longitudinal data are available, an assessment can be made of the extent to 
which individuals have been able at follow-up to achieve the aspirations 
expressed at the first interview.  
 
5.3 Aggregation vs prioritisation 
When analysing multiple dimensions and multiple groups, there is always the 
temptation to aggregate into an index or summary variable so as to be able to 
arrive at a unique ranking of all individuals or groups. Aside from satisfying a 
reductionist urge, this has two purposes: to make the information manageable, 
and to indicate priorities for policy intervention.  
 
However, attempting to summarise inequalities in this way encounters both 
conceptual and technical difficulties. Firstly, there may be no such thing as “the 
most unequal individual” (or group); indeed it is difficult to see what meaning 
can be attached to this idea. Secondly, retaining multi-dimensionality is 
essential if the analysis of inequality is to reflect the plurality of human ends. 
My opportunities for social interaction cannot sensibly be traded off against my 
literacy. Thirdly, calculating inequality across social classes in the distribution 
of ‘apples and pears’ is possible because we know how many apples can be 
purchased for the price of a pear, but there is no comparable metric for the 
distribution of ‘good health and employment’, or indeed for many of the other 
capabilities under consideration.   
 
This is not, though, a counsel of despair. Information can be made more 
manageable without losing multi-dimensionality by selecting a small number of 
headline indicators corresponding to distinct domains of inequality (for 
example, consumption, production, social interaction, and autonomy), and 
presenting other indicators and analysis under each heading. DWP are adopting 
this approach for their measurements of child poverty (DWP, 2003).  
 
Priorities can be identified by making comparisons within domains of inequality 
across groups, or within groups across dimensions. Within a given domain, say 
political participation, it may be possible to determine that the gap between the 
most and least disadvantaged group by disability status is greater than inequality 
measured in the same way by sex, for example. However, where the number or 
size of groups differs substantially, such a comparison may produce little real 
information (larger groups tend to be closer to the mean).   
 
Finally, cross-group cross-dimension ranking may be possible (if it is 
considered desirable) for a sub-set of groups or dimensions, namely in those 
cases where one group is consistently worse off than another. Ranking those 
instances where one group is worse off on one dimension and another group is 
worse off on another dimension, requires an additional judgement about the 
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relative ‘badness’ of inequality in the two dimensions respectively, and this may 
be best avoided. The result is therefore likely to be a ‘partial ranking’. This 
approach has been discussed and applied extensively in the literature on the 
capability approach (using terms like partial ordering and vector dominance; see 
for example, Qizilbash, 2004). 
 
5.4 Inequality within groups 
In undertaking analysis by characteristics such as gender and ethnicity, it is of 
course important to be aware that averages can conceal considerable variation. 
In particular some sub-groups may be much more disadvantaged than others. 
Four further kinds of analysis can improve the sensitivity of the measures, in 
ascending order of complexity:  
 
(i) Measures of distribution around the average for each main 
classification. For example, if the distribution of white girls’ 
educational attainment is more widely spread than girls from an 
Asian background, this may be a cause for concern, even if the 
mean (or median) is the same.  
 
(ii) Further breakdowns specific to the characteristic in question. For 
example, when considering inequality between disabled and non-
disabled people, further analysis by type and severity of 
impairment will clearly be important. 
 
(iii) Interactions between different key characteristics where relevant. 
For example, with respect to employment, comparisons by gender 
and ethnicity jointly are likely to be revealing (for example, 
whether the gap between male and female employment rates varies 
by ethnic group).  
 
(iv) Other classifications which could reveal significantly 
disadvantaged sub-groups across all six key characteristics. One 
example here might be social class.   
 
With respect to both (iii) and (iv), it is important that the selection of further 
characteristics for analysis is hypothesis-driven, rather than attempting to 
compute every possible combination (known in the trade as ‘kitchen sink’ 
analysis). Is there any reason to believe that differences between age groups in 
employment rates will vary by sexual orientation? If so, that can be tested. If 
not, the analysis can be skipped. In general there is a need to balance sensitivity 
(i.e. detecting inequality where it exists) against clarity (i.e. not losing the 
message in the detail).    
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6. Conclusion 
The ideal measure of inequality for the Equalities Review would meet a number 
of criteria:  
 
? well-grounded theoretically;  
? multi-dimensional; 
? transparent; 
? quantifiable; 
? capable of tracking change over time; 
? applicable to inequality for each group (as defined by sex, ethnicity, 
disability, sexual orientation, religion and age). 
 
The choice of measurement tools depends on what kind of equality or inequality 
one is seeking to measure – equality of what and equality between whom. This 
paper has set out a number of options and argued that the capability approach is 
attractive from a theoretical point of view. Although data availability will 
impose some limitations on what can be achieved in practice, in principle the 
capability approach allows all of the measurement criteria listed above to be 
met.  
 
? The capability approach is inherently multi-dimensional, reflecting the 
plurality of objectives which people have in their lives. Substantive 
freedom consists in the ability to do or be a wide range of things.  
 
? The transparency of capability-based measures would be enhanced by 
engaging in public consultation about which particular capabilities should 
be selected for measurement, and this strategy is given strong support 
from within the capability literature.  
 
? A hierarchy of measurement, with some capabilities assessed by looking 
at outcomes, and some evaluated with a mixture of evidence on outcomes 
and values, allows equality to be quantified without losing the advantages 
of a concept based on equality of opportunities. 
 
? Change over time can be detected by narrowing of gaps within or 
between groups, or within or between domains of inequality.  
 
? The capability approach is well-suited to analysis of inequality by 
characteristics of individuals and has been used extensively for that 
purpose, especially with respect to sex and ethnicity.  
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